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ABSTRACT. 
Data privacy is something that must be stored securely especially in a government system. 
The Indonesian government has introduced a universal coverage system that adopts 
Diagnosis Related Group (DRG), namely Indonesia Case Base Group (INA-CBG). 
INA-CBG is used to improve the service of healthcare providers and integrate user data 
into one database. Hence, there is a possibility of security gaps in protecting data from 
unauthorized users. Therefore, an analysis was performed based on the regulation 
published in Indonesia and the current INA-CBG system. A security lattice model of 
access control was produced to set constraints to prevent data privacy from being retrieved 
by unauthorized users. There are five security level categorizations, as follows Public, 
Research, Clinical, Financial, and Provider. Each security level was assigned to 26 
attributes which are components of the current INA-CBG system. Furthermore, a 
simulation has been performed based on the model developed to ensure that the assigned 
level is correct. The results of the simulation will be used as a reference in determining the 
security lattice of each attribute if the result shows there are inappropriate levels. 
 
Keywords: Security Level, Security Lattice, INA-CBG, DRG, Universal Coverage 
System. 
 
1. Introduction.  
The internet revolution has changed the world communication infrastructure with a lot of 
data exchange including data privacy [1]. Data privacy is something that must be kept 
confidential [2]. To maintain the data, we need a system and the right knowledge to store 
and determine which data can be accessed by people who have the authority [3]. Inevitably, 
this becomes a difficulty for system developers and users who use the system. The more 
  
 
 
secure a system makes the more difficult a system is used by its users. Developers must 
consider the extent to which they must create a system that is secure in preserving their data 
and is easy to use by users [4].  
One system that needs serious consideration in its development is a government 
system that stores public data [5]. The government system must be very secure from all 
existing attacks from parties who do not have the authority. The Indonesian government has 
a Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS) which provides a universal coverage 
system under the name Indonesia Case Base Group (INA-CBG) [6] which is regulated in 
[7]. INA-CBG adopted the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) which grouped patients based 
on diagnoses and similar procedures to improve health service providers by changing the 
payment system [8]. Patients who are members and want to use the service must input their 
data into the system. Even though sensitive data has been regulated in [9] to ensure that 
data cannot be retrieved directly without complying with certain policies, the INA-CBG 
system integrates patient data into one database which makes it hard to ensure that there is 
no violation for privacy. There is a possibility of fraud such as aggregated patient illnesses 
that can be leaked to third parties such as pharmacies. If they know which area with 
illnesses that often occur, they can increase the medicine price in a particular area. This will 
be detrimental to people with illnesses without insurance. Besides, BPJS also provides a 
hospital information system named Sistem Informasi Manajemen Rumah Sakit (SIMRS) 
that regulated in [10] which has a bridging component to INA-CBG system.  
Based on the problem, this research proposes a model of privacy assurance based 
on access control and partial order set which regulates confidentiality in a universal 
coverage system. This model will be used as a reference to make constraints. There are 63 
constraints have been used to prevent violation transaction consisting of basic constraints, 
inference constraints, association constraints, and upper bound constraints. The developed 
constraints are made based on attributes in the healthcare provider. Then, secure 
information flow is applied to ensure information only can be read by authorized parties. 
Moreover, to prove the correctness of each constraint, algorithms and simulation using 
programming language will be performed to check whether the constraints have the right 
security level or vice versa. 
 
2. Partial Order Set. 
A binary relation can be said as partial ordering relation if the characteristics of that relation 
are reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive [11]. Furthermore, it can be said as partial 
ordering relation if there are at least two items and one is larger or smaller. A Partial Order 
Set (Poset) can be described in the diagram, namely Hasse Diagram. Hasse Diagram has a 
pattern of tiers to the top. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Hasse Diagram 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1 shows an example of a Hasse Diagram. A is the lowest level and E is the 
highest level in the given diagram. A higher level may access the item below it, but the 
lower level cannot access the item above it. Furthermore, the Hasse Diagram has upper 
bounds and lower bounds for each node. A node is a Least Upper Bound (LUB) if it is 
upper bound for all nodes below it and there is no other upper bound. A node is a Greatest 
Lower Bound (GLB) if it is a lower bound of all nodes below it and there is no other lower 
bound. A lattice is a Poset (L, ≥) that has LUB and GLB. 
 
3. Basic Definitions. 
Access class AC is made to prevent violations in access control. AC is assumed as a pair of 
the form a security level L and a set of attributes A. The relation between that pair is limited 
by a Poset, namely dominance relation ≥. The ≥ shows information which can be seen is 
information that has the same level as the subject or below. For instance, the expression A ≥ 
b means A dominates b. A may read the information on the level b or below. Besides, the 
partial order set (AC, ≥) is assumed as a classification lattice LT. Therefore, LT which will 
be used is partial order set (L, ≥) to specify A in LT may have dynamic security levels L. 
Furthermore, classification constraints C specify security levels on attributes based on 
confidentiality. A constraint c consists pair of lhs and rhs, where c ∈ C. In lhs and rhs can 
be a security level L or a mapping λ: A → L, where (L, ≥) is a classification lattice. 
Constraints will be classified as basic constraints, inference constraints, association 
constraints, and upper bound constraints. 
Basic constraints Cbasic are constraints that specify the security level on each 
attribute. In Cbasic, AC has a mapping of attribute λ(A) and a security level L. Furthermore, 
Cbasic map an attribute to a specific level, λ(A) ≥ L, when a ∈ A and l ∈ L. It can be 
assumed that attribute A has a level L. Inference constraints Cinference are made to prevent 
bypassing of Cbasic through data inference. Afterward, Cinference maps attributes, λ(ax) ≥ λ(ay), 
when ax ∈ A and ay ∈ A. It can be assumed that if the attribute in ax is known, then the 
attribute in ay can also be known. Association constraints Cassociation are made to limit the 
information that may be known by a combination of attributes. It requires the least upper 
bound of the classifications to dominate the security level given by basic constraints. For 
instance, lub{λ(ax), λ(ay)} ≥ L, where ax ∈ A, ay ∈ A, and l ∈ L. That constraint 
requires lub of the classifications between λ(ax) and λ(ay) to dominate a security level. 
Upper bound constraints Cupper are made to guarantee an attribute is always accessible to a 
specific level. These constraints prevent the classification of attributes being raised above 
certain levels. The mapping of Cupper is performed by setting a specific level and a specific 
attribute, L ≥ λ(A), where a ∈ A and l ∈ L. In addition, upper bound constraints can 
indirectly affect other attributes to have the same security level. Base case constraints Cbase 
will be created for induction method evaluation. In this constraint, all attributes will be 
assigned as the highest security level. 
 
4. Constructed Model. 
A new model is shown in Figure 2 by looking at the information flow process. The 
constructed model has a security lattice LT which will describe the relation of each attribute 
A from the lowest level Public to the highest level, Provider, where LT = (L, ≥). Due to this 
  
 
 
lattice, each attribute a will not have a static security level but may have a dynamic security 
level l. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. The Lattice of Constructed Model 
 
In the lowest level Public, some variables can be known by all of the people. Then, 
in the Research, some variables cannot be known by all of the people and should be given a 
higher level than Public. In addition, in Clinical, some variables can be revealed by 
combining the variables between the variable in Public and variable in Research. Then, at 
the highest level, Provider can read all of the variables. This level is usually owned by the 
government so that they can assess each patient. 
 
5. Evaluation Method. 
Attributes that will be submitted to the system consist of 26 attributes. The model uses 
these attributes which must be assigned to a certain security level. This assignment must 
comply with certain classification constraints. Therefore, this work solves the problem of 
lattice assignment which formulated as follows: 
 
Problem 1 (Lattice-Assignment) given A, LT = (L, ≥), Cbasic, Cbase, Cinference, Cassociation, and 
Cupper that satisfy λ: A ≥ L. 
 
To proof the correctness of our model, this work will use the induction method as an 
evaluation method. 
 
Theorem 1 (Correctness) the algorithms in [12] solve Problem 1 (Lattice-Assignment). 
Given A, LT = (L, ≥), Cbasic, Cbase, Cinference, Cassociation, and Cupper that satisfy C or terminates 
with Failure if C are inconsistent. 
 
Lemma 1 (Correctness) shows the correctness of algorithms by proofing the consistent of 
the constructed model and the termination of algorithms. 
 
Proof: Let c be a set of classification constraints over a set of attributes and a classification 
lattice. 
A. If the result of computeUpperBound is Failure, then the sequence of constraints is 
inconsistent. 
B. If the result of computeUpperBound is Success, then the checked classification of 
mapping λ: A → L satisfies c(λ ╞ c), then the sequence of constraints is consistent. 
C. computeUpperBound process always terminates. 
 
To prove (A): for all mappings λ not dominate λ’, there exists a constraint c ∈ c such that λ’ 
  
 
 
not equal with c. In addition, in the process of computeUpperBound, it is not possible to 
change the levels of the variable to higher. 
To prove (B): mapping λ satisfies a sequence of constraints c by induction method. If 
mapping λ satisfies all immediate constraints on attributes in all constraints c, then λ ≥ λ’, 
there exists a constraint c ≥ c such that λ’ ╞ c. 
To prove (C): computeUpperBound is arranged in a finite set based on the constraints. 
Each constraint will be called and checked by several functions. Each function will return a 
value in the process of checking, namely Success or Failure. If the result is Failure, then the 
process will be terminated. If the result is Success, then the process will be continued until 
the end of the program which will produce upper bounds. 
 
6. Classified Constraints. 
6.1 Basic Constraints. 
Basic constraints assign security levels for each attribute. The purpose of basic constraints 
is to give basic security level and ascertain which attribute has a higher level in 
confidentiality. In our case, there are 26 basic constraints according to Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. Basic Constraints 
C1: λ(Healthcare provider code number) ≥ 
Public 
C14: λ(Procedure) ≥ Public 
C2: λ(Healthcare provider name) ≥ Public C15: λ(Length of stay) ≥ Public 
C3: λ(Healthcare provider class) ≥ Public C16: λ(Main diagnosis) ≥ Research 
C4: λ(Dates of discharge) ≥ Public C17: λ(Secondary diagnosis) ≥ Research 
C5: λ(Age (year)) ≥ Public C18: λ(Activity daily living) ≥ Research 
C6: λ(Age (day)) ≥ Public C19: λ(INA-CBG code) ≥ Research 
C7: λ(Dates of birth) ≥ Public C20: λ(Special CMG) ≥ Research 
C8: λ(Gender) ≥ Public C21: λ(INA-CBG description) ≥ Public 
C9: λ(Treatment class) ≥ Public C22: λ(SEP number) ≥ Clinical 
C10: λ(Dates of admission) ≥ Public C23: λ(Medical record number) ≥ Clinical 
C11: λ(Treatment type) ≥ Public C24: λ(Top-up rates) ≥ Financial 
C12: λ(Patient status) ≥ Public C25: λ(Healthcare provider rates) ≥ 
Financial 
C13: λ(Birth weight) ≥ Public C26: λ(Total fare) ≥ Financial 
 
Main diagnosis and Secondary diagnosis are assigned higher than Public. This is 
because the diagnosis of a patient may not be known by anyone other than the patient and 
healthcare provider. Moreover, all attributes which are related to patient and healthcare 
provider are assigned as Research. This is because those attributes may not be known 
generally. Furthermore, SEP number and Medical record number are assigned higher than 
Research, namely Clinical. This is because if someone knows SEP number or Medical 
record number, they may know about patient information, such as who and which disease. 
 
6.2 Inference Constraints. 
Inference constraints are made to prevent bypassing basic constraints through data 
inference. In our case, there are 22 inference constraints according to Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2. Inference Constraints 
  
 
 
C27: λ(Healthcare provider code number) ≥ 
λ(Healthcare provider name) 
C38: λ(Main diagnosis) ≥ λ(Procedure)  
C28: λ(Healthcare provider code number) ≥ 
λ(Healthcare provider class) 
C39: λ(Secondary diagnosis) ≥ 
λ(Procedure) 
C29: λ(Healthcare provider name) ≥ 
λ(Healthcare provider code number) 
C40: λ(Special CMG) ≥ λ(Procedure) 
C30: λ(Healthcare provider name) ≥ 
λ(Healthcare provider class) 
C41: λ(INA-CBG code) ≥ λ(Procedure) 
C31: λ(Length of stay) ≥ λ(Treatment type) C42: λ(INA-CBG description) ≥ 
λ(Procedure) 
C32: λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Gender) C43: λ(INA-CBG code) ≥ λ(Main 
diagnosis) 
C33: λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Dates of birth) C44: λ(INA-CBG code) ≥ λ(Secondary 
diagnosis) 
C34: λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Treatment class) C45: λ(INA-CBG description) ≥ λ(Main 
diagnosis) 
C35: λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Treatment type) C46: λ(INA-CBG description) ≥ 
λ(Secondary diagnosis) 
C36: λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Main diagnosis) C47: λ(INA-CBG description) ≥ 
λ(INA-CBG code) 
C37: λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Secondary 
diagnosis) 
C48: λ(INA-CBG code) ≥ λ(INA-CBG 
description) 
 
6.3 Association Constraints. 
Association constraints are made to limit the information which may be exposed by a 
combination of attributes. It requires the least upper bound of the classifications to 
dominate the security level given by basic constraints. There are 10 association constraints 
according to Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3. Association Constraints 
C49: lub{λ(Healthcare provider code 
number), λ(Main diagnosis)} ≥ Clinical 
C54:  lub{λ(Healthcare provider name), 
λ(Main diagnosis)} ≥ Clinical 
C50: lub{λ(Healthcare provider code 
number), λ(Secondary diagnosis)} ≥ 
Clinical 
C55: lub{λ(Healthcare provider name), 
λ(Secondary diagnosis)} ≥ Clinical 
C51: lub{λ(Healthcare provider code 
number), λ(INA-CBG code)} ≥ Clinical 
C56: lub{λ(Healthcare provider name), 
λ(INA-CBG code)} ≥ Clinical 
C52: lub{λ(Healthcare provider code 
number), λ(INA-CBG description)} ≥ 
Clinical 
C57: lub{λ(Healthcare provider name), 
λ(INA-CBG description)} ≥ Clinical 
C53: lub{λ(Healthcare provider code 
number), λ(Special CMG)} ≥ Clinical 
C58: lub{λ(Healthcare provider name), 
λ(Special CMG)} ≥ Clinical 
 
6.4 Upper Bound Constraints. 
Upper bound constraints are made to ensure the attribute is always accessible to a specific 
level. These constraints prevent the classification of attributes from being increased. In our 
case, there are five upper bound constraints according to Table 4. 
  
 
 
 
TABLE 4. Upper Bound Constraints 
C59: Clinical ≥ λ(Main diagnosis) C62: Clinical ≥ λ(INA-CBG description) 
C60: Clinical ≥ λ(Secondary diagnosis) C63: Clinical ≥ λ(Special CMG) 
C61: Clinical ≥ λ(INA-CBG code)  
 
7. Result and Discussion. 
A simulation will be performed for the proposed model by running the program which 
implemented the model. The results obtained are λ(Main diagnosis) = Clinical; 
λ(Secondary diagnosis) = Clinical; λ(INA-CBG code) = Clinical; λ(INA-CBG description) 
= Clinical; λ(Special CMG) = Clinical; λ(SEP number) = Clinical; λ(Healthcare provider 
name) = Provider; λ(Healthcare provider code number) = Provider. Furthermore, those 
results will be used to evaluate the consistency of results. The objective is to ensure the 
constructed model already provides consistent constraints. 
 Moreover, the induction method is applied to prove the correctness of the proposed 
model. As a base case, each attribute will be assigned as the highest level. Then it should be 
checked using the induction step. When computeUpperBound computes all attributes in A 
have already complied, then the constructed model is correct. If nothing changes, then the 
model is consistent. Because Provider dominates all attributes, constraints C are consistent. 
In the base case, Main diagnosis, Secondary diagnosis, INA-CBG code, INA-CBG 
description, Special CMG are assigned as Provider. However, the level must comply with 
the Cupper. Hence, Main diagnosis, Secondary diagnosis, INA-CBG code, INA-CBG 
description, Special CMG will be assigned as Clinical. In addition, all related variables will 
be evaluated.  
From the result of computeUpperBound, several analyses will be performed to 
check whether constraints are consistent. First, because these attributes dominate Procedure, 
then Procedure should be lowered to Clinical. Since Clinical ≥ Public, the statement is still 
true. Second, the analysis will be performed for λ(Main diagnosis) ≥ Research and the 
others. Since in Cupper, Main Diagnosis and the others are assigned as Clinical, then the 
result is Clinical ≥ Research. It is still true because of Clinical dominates Research. Third, 
the analysis will be performed for λ(SEP number) ≥ λ(Main diagnosis) and λ(SEP number) 
≥ λ(Secondary diagnosis). Since SEP Number is assigned as Clinical still dominates Main 
diagnosis and Secondary diagnosis that assigned as Clinical means it is still true. Fourth, 
the association of the following attributes will be checked such as lub{λ(Healthcare 
Provider code number), λ(Main diagnosis)} ≥ Clinical; lub{λ(Healthcare provider name), 
λ(INA-CBG code)} ≥ Clinical. Since Healthcare provider name and Healthcare provider 
code number are assigned as Provider, then Main diagnosis and INA-CBG code are 
assigned as Clinical, the statement is true. This is because of lub{Provider, Clinical) ≥ 
Clinical. Therefore, the constraints C of the proposed model are consistent because no 
modification is needed. 
 
9. Conclusion. 
In the information system, the obligation to maintain users’ privacy sometimes is not taken 
care of properly. This is because developers are only concerned about functionality. The 
Indonesian government has introduced BPJS system for universal coverage. BPJS can 
improve healthcare provider service by changing the payment system that adopts INA-CBG. 
In this work, a model had been proposed to ensure data privacy. The constructed model is 
  
 
 
created as a security lattice. Simulation has also been implemented using a programming 
language to check the consistency of classification constraints and to produce complaint 
upper bounds. The results of this simulation are correct and consistent because there are no 
changes in determining the security level. 
 For future development, a dynamic security lattice model will be created by using 
dynamic taint analysis to adapt to the condition that can be changed by government 
regulations, every healthcare provider’s regulations, or the customer needs. Therefore, it 
will affect each healthcare provider to have their customized access control in competing 
and improving their services. 
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